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THE FDA’S NEXT PROPOSAL OF AN
OPIOID RISK EVALUATION AND
MITIGATION STRATEGY (REMS)
Hilary Homenko†
“We are going to need to find a balance between ensuring patients can achieve adequate pain control
with access to opioid therapies while taking steps to
protect against addiction and death.”1
“FDA is not going to be able to do this alone.”2
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INTRODUCTION
Abuse and dependence on prescription pain relievers has reached
epidemic proportions in the United States.3 In 2010, a study published by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration estimated that 5.1 million persons, aged twelve or older, use
prescription pain relievers non-medically.4 Within this population,
approximately 1.9 million persons have dependence on or abuse prescription pain relievers.5 While prescription pain relievers, commonly
3
See Results from the 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health:
Summary
of
National
Findings,
SAMHSA.GOV,
1
(Sept.
2011),
http://oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH/2k10NSDUH/2k10Results.pdf.
4
Id. at 12.
5
Id. at 70.
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referred to as opioids, effectively reduce chronic and acute pain, no
one seems spared from the health risks associated with them.6 Between 1998 and 2008, the percentage of hospital admissions involving
opioid abuse increased by 7.6 percent, with significant increases
across every age cohort and racial category.7
In 2007, Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration
Amendment Act (FDAAA), which gave the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) greater authority to regulate prescription drugs,
including opioids.8 Congress specifically granted the FDA the authority to require a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) as
part of a drug approval application.9 A REMS is a written plan developed by a drug manufacturer that identifies the risks associated with a
particular prescription drug and describes the program(s) that a manufacturer will implement to help prevent the risks from materializing.10
Programs may include, but are not limited to, a medication guide or a
special training program for health care providers prescribing the
manufacturer’s drugs.11 The FDA can require manufacturers to submit a REMS with a drug approval application.12 Alternatively, it can
require a manufacturer to submit a REMS after drug approval, when
newly discovered information brings into question whether the benefits of the drug outweigh its risks.13
Recently, the FDA experienced a setback with regard to improving opioid regulation through REMS. In July 2010, the Anesthetic
and Life Support Drug Advisory Committee and the Drug Safety and
Risk Management Advisory Committee evaluated the FDA’s proposal
for an opioid REMS, meaning a standard written plan that all manufacturers would have to complete, if they sought drug approval for an
opioid.14 The advisory committees rejected the FDA’s initial proposal

6

Jane C. Ballantyne & Jianren Mao, Medical Progress: Opioid Therapy for
Chronic Pain, 349 N. ENG. J. MED. 1943, 1943 (2003).
7
The TEDS Report: Substance Abuse Treatment Admissions Involving
Abuse of Pain Relievers: 1998 and 2008, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH
SERVS.
ADMIN.,
1
(July
15,
2011),
http://oas.samhsa.gov/2k10/230/230PainRelvr2k10Web.pdf.
8
See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, 21 U.S.C. §
355-1 (2011) [hereinafter FDAAA].
9
Id.
10
See id.
11
See id. § 355-1(e).
12
Id. § 355-1(a)(1).
13
Id. § 355-1(a)(2)(A).
14
Having an opioid REMS would improve the FDA’s efficiency during the
drug approval process. An opioid REMS would eliminate the need for the FDA to
design a unique set of REMS requirements for each manufacturer seeking drug ap-
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because they thought the regulations applying to doctor training were
too weak.15 Going forward, the FDA should focus its efforts on
strengthening the regulatory requirements under the next opioid
REMS proposal. However, the FDA cannot single-handedly solve all
of the opioid-related drug problems through REMS. The FDA should
collaborate with regulatory agencies at the state level to achieve the
proper balance between opioid regulation and medically necessary
opioid use.
This Note will explore current opioid-related drug problems in the
United States and will make recommendations for how the FDA
should proceed with developing an opioid REMS. Part I of this Note
will discuss the current problems associated with opioids, including
(1) misuse and abuse, (2) drug diversion, and (3) undertreatment of
chronic and acute pain. Part II will explain the FDA’s authority before and after Congress enacted the FDAAA, specifically describing
the new three-tiered regulatory strategy that the FDA can employ to
regulate drugs after the approval process. Part II will also explain the
benefits of having a general opioid REMS, which include improved
efficiency of the FDA’s drug approval process and increased manufacturer compliance with REMS requirements. Part III will identify
why both the initial opioid REMS proposal and the FDAAA fell short
of addressing the problems discussed in Part I. Finally, Part IV will
recommend that the next opioid REMS proposal contain a mandatory
training program, funded by manufacturers, for the purpose of educating doctors about the risks of prescribing opioids. Part IV will also
outline an approach for improving opioid regulation outside of REMS
by encouraging FDA collaboration with the states, since state medical
boards have the authority to directly regulate doctors who prescribe
opioids.16 Through greater collaboration with regulatory agencies at
the state level, the FDA can successfully reduce opioid risks without
sacrificing the availability of chronic and acute pain relief.

proval for an opioid. See Transcript for FDA’s Media Briefing on the Safe Use of
Opioids, FDA (Feb. 9, 2009),
www.fda.gov/downloads/NewsEvents/Newsroom/MediaTranscripts/
UCM166237.pdf.
15
See Joint Meeting of the Anesthetic and Life Support Drugs Advisory
Committee & Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee, FDA, 217
(July 23, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drugs/AnestheticAndLifeSupportDrugsAdvisoryC
ommittee/UCM224671.pdf [hereinafter Joint Meeting Transcript].
16
See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 271-72 (2006).
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PROBLEMS ENDEMIC TO OPIOID USE
A.

Abuse and Misuse by Chronic and Acute Pain
Patients
1.

Early Opioid Regulation

Opium has been used around the world for centuries to alleviate
pain.17 In 1806, a German pharmacist isolated a pure substance from
the opium poppy plant, which he called morphine.18 His work inspired scientists several years later to create synthetic versions of the
chemicals extracted from the opium poppy plants.19 Medications containing these synthetic chemicals are known as opioids.
In the nineteenth century, nonmedical use of opioids and other
drugs such as heroine became increasingly popular.20 Due to the
health risks posed by these drugs when used inappropriately, opioids
became strictly regulated by some local and state laws by the end of
the century.21 For example, San Francisco passed a local law in 1875
that prohibited people from smoking opium in places other than an
opium den, while other cities passed laws that prohibited opium use
altogether.22 In the cities that adopted stricter policies, opioids became unavailable to many people legitimately seeking pain relief.23
Fortunately, in the twentieth century, opioids became accepted
again as a mainstream medical treatment for acute and chronic pain.24
In 1996, the American Society of Anesthesiology adopted guidelines
for treating chronic pain, which made recommendations about evaluating patients for drug therapies involving opioids.25 Opioid pain re17

Ballantyne & Mao, supra note 6, at 1943.
The German pharmacist, Friedrich Wilhelm Adam Sertürner, named the
chemical morphine after Morpheus, the Greek god of dreams. Ryan J. Huxtable &
Stephan K. W. Schwarz, The Isolation of Morphine: First Principles in Science and
Ethics, 1 MOLECULAR INTERVENTIONS 189, 189 (2001), available at
http://molinterv.aspetjournals.org/content/1/4/189.full.pdf+html.
19
Id. at 191.
20
Ballantyne & Mao, supra note 6, at 1943.
21
Id. The first federal law to regulate drugs did not occur until the Pure
Food and Drug Act of 1906. Nat’l Alliance of Advocates for Buprenorphine Treatment, A History of Opiate Opioid Laws in the United States, NAABT.ORG,
http://www.naabt.org/laws.cfm (last updated July 27, 2011).
22
Nat’l Alliance of Advocates for Buprenorphine Treatment, supra note 21.
23
Ballantyne & Mao, supra note 6, at 1943.
24
Id.
25
See Am. Soc’y of Anesthesiologists, Practice Guidelines for Chronic Pain
Management, 112 ANESTHESIOLOGY 810, 817-19 (2010).
18
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lievers commonly used today include morphine, hydrocodone, and
oxycodone.26
2.

Illustrations of Opioid Abuse and Misuse

One of the prevailing problems associated with treating chronic
and acute pain is opioid abuse and misuse. While the terms “abuse”
and “misuse” are often defined as different drug-related behaviors, it
is hard to clearly distinguish between them in practical terms.27
Suppose a doctor writes a prescription for patient A. It is for a
high dose of oxycodone to be taken over the course of several weeks,
while the patient recovers from a serious knee surgery.28 Patient A’s
chart indicates that he has a history of substance abuse. After finishing the prescription, patient A’s knee pain is gone, but he experiences
withdrawal symptoms after being without oxycodone for several
hours. Patient A returns to his doctor and falsely reports severe knee
pain. During the office visit, patient A also exhibits signs of withdrawal including goose bumps and dilated pupils.29 Nonetheless, patient A successfully receives another prescription of oxycodone and
repeats this behavior several more times. Patient A likely falls into
the category of abuse because he knowingly misrepresented his medical condition to the doctor for the purpose of obtaining a medically
unnecessary prescription. The doctor is likely at fault for prescribing
26

Morphine can be isolated from opium poppy seeds and alterations to its
molecular structure create a semi-synthetic compound. See Scott C. Armstrong &
Kelly L. Cozza, Pharmacokinetic Drug Interactions of Morphine, Codeine, and Their
Derivatives: Theory and Clinical Reality, Part II, 44 PSYCHOSOMATICS 515, 516
(2003); Laxmaiah Manchikanti, National Drug Control Policy and Prescription Drug
Abuse: Facts and Fallacies, 10 PAIN PHYSICIAN 399, 401 (2007).
27
The World Health Organization adopted the following definitions from the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IIIR), which is a manual that assists clinicians in diagnosing psychiatric disorders. “Abuse” means “a maladaptive pattern of
use ...despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent social, occupational, psychological or physical problem that is caused…[by] recurrent use….” Similarly,
“misuse” means “[u]se of a substance for a purpose not consistent with legal or medical guidelines, as in the non-medical use of prescription medications.” Reference to
the WHO definitions is necessary because FDA definitions for “abuse” and “misuse”
do not yet exist. Furthermore, while “abuse” and “misuse” are often used colloquially
to describe individuals who intentionally use or deal illicit drugs, such an inference
should not be made when reading this Note. See Lexicon of Alcohol and Drug Terms
by
the
World
Health
Organization,
WHO,
http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/terminology/who_lexicon/en/ (last visited Oct.
4, 2011).
28
See Andrea M. Trescot et al., Opioid Guidelines in the Management of
Chronic Non-Cancer Pain, 9 PAIN PHYSICIAN 1, 14 (2006).
29
Id. at 16.
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high doses of opioids to a patient with a history of substance abuse.
The doctor may be subject to liability for failing to perform a thorough physical examination at the follow-up visit, which likely would
have detected the patient’s withdrawal symptoms and underlying addiction.
Now suppose the doctor writes the same oxycodone prescription
for patient B, who has also recently undergone serious knee surgery.
After a few days of taking the prescription, patient B is still experiencing persistent knee pain. To try and alleviate the pain, patient B decides to take the dose twice as frequently as the doctor prescribed.
Patient B returns to the doctor two weeks early to refill his prescription. He honestly reports knee pain and does not exhibit any obvious
signs of withdrawal. Patient B may fall into the category of misuse
for taking his prescription against medical instructions. If this behavior persists, however, patient B may also fall into the category of
abuse. Due to the overlap of terminology, in this Note the terms
“abuse and misuse” will be used collectively to describe both (1) a
physician administering opioids contrary to the practices of a reasonable physician, and (2) a patient taking opioids contrary to the instructions of a reasonable physician.
3.

Clinical Origins of Opioid Abuse and Misuse

While opioids have been used as pain relievers for hundreds of
years, only recently has the medical field made recommendations on
how they should be administered to patients.30 In 1998, the Federation of State Medical Boards published its first set of model guidelines
for using opioids to treat pain.31 The guidelines apply to doctors treating both acute and chronic pain patients.32 Professional organizations,
such as the American Society of Anesthesiology, have also developed
guidelines that recommend quasi-objective methods for measuring a
patient’s pain.33 For example, the guidelines suggest that doctors ask
30

See Ballantyne & Mao, supra note 6, at 1943.
See Model Guidelines for the Use of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, FEDERATION OF STATE MED. BOARDS OF THE U.S., 1 (May 2004),
http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/2004_grpol_Controlled_Substances.pdf.
32
Trescot, supra note 28, at 2, 12, 14. Acute pain patients typically experience pain for a short, discrete period of time and the pain disappears when treatment
resolves an underlying medical condition such as disease or infection. Chronic pain
patients typically experience pain that persists for a long period of time and that does
not respond to ordinary pain medication. See Acute v. Chronic Pain, CLEVELAND
CLINIC,http://my.clevelandclinic.org/services/pain_management/hic_acute_vs_chroni
c_pain.aspx (last updated Sept. 12, 2008).
33
See Am. Soc’y of Anesthesiologists, supra note 25.
31
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patients to rate their pain intensity on a numerical scale.34 Doctors are
instructed to record the result at each visit in order to track the patient’s progress over time.35 Although the numerical measurement is
based on the patient’s subjective pain experience, it is quasi-objective
when compared to feedback from the same patient during previous
visits.
Despite the medical field’s efforts to objectively measure pain, it
remains a substantially subjective experience, which can only be conveyed through a patient’s self-report.36 Researchers have found that
emotional, mental, physical, and spiritual factors influence a patient’s
pain perception.37 For example, one study observed that the gender of
the examiner influenced a patient’s feedback about pain.38 Patients
tolerated pain for longer periods of time before expressing it when the
examiner was the opposite gender.39 When pain reaches the threshold
of evoking a response, patients generally communicate through words
or expressions.40 However, language barriers due to national origin or
disability may further diminish a patient’s ability to communicate.41
Pain reports by disabled patients may be limited to sounds, facial expressions, or translations of a guardian or interpreter.42
Since doctors are limited by the information they can gather about
a patient, a doctor’s diagnosis is only as accurate as her understanding
of the patient’s pain experience. Sometimes a doctor may prescribe a
dose that is too low, and the patient remains in pain—a situation
commonly known as undertreatment.43 Undertreatment is estimated
to occur in 43 percent of cancer patients seeking relief from acute
pain.44 On the other hand, doctors may prescribe a dose that is too
34
Am. Soc’y of Anesthesiologists, Practice Guidelines for Cancer Pain
Management: A Report by the American Society of Anesthesiologists Task Force on
Pain Management, 84 ANESTHESIOLOGY 1243, 1245 (1996).
35
See id.
36
Some researchers have begun to experiment with functional MRI technology, which would enable medical professionals to observe the brain’s physical response to pain, but it is still doubtful that this technology would replace a patient’s
subjective feedback. Adam Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective
Experience, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 433, 447 (2007); see also Trescot, supra note 28, at
3.
37
Trescot, supra note 28, at 27.
38
Kolber, supra note 36, at 446-47.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 440.
41
See id.
42
See id.
43
See S. Deandrea et al., Prevalence of Undertreatment in Cancer Pain: A
Review of Published Literature, 19 ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY 1985, 1987 (2008).
44
The estimate was based on a review of twenty-six other studies. Id.
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high or prescribe opioids for too long, resulting in addiction. In the
past decade, the rate of opioid addiction in patients seeking relief from
chronic pain was estimated to be 3.27 percent.45 Another study estimated, however, that abuse risk ranges between 0–50 percent for
chronic pain patients.46 Patients fall at the higher end of the range, if
they have a history of substance abuse or addiction.47 Due to the difficulty in properly prescribing opioids, patients may experience problems like opioid addiction at one end of the spectrum and undertreatment at the opposite end. Understanding the relationship between
these two opioid-related problems is crucial to finding the proper balance between opioid regulation and medically necessary opioid use.
4.

Potential Magnitude of Opioid Abuse and
Misuse

The potential magnitude of opioid abuse is alarming considering
that, in 2007, doctors wrote 21 million opioid prescriptions for 3.7
million individuals.48 The high volume of opioid prescriptions reflects a decade of escalating opioid prescribing habits. Between 1992
and 2002, the U.S. population increased by 13 percent, but prescriptions for noncontrolled substances increased by 57 percent, and prescriptions for controlled substances increased by 154 percent.49 During a similar time period, the number of people abusing controlled
substances jumped 94 percent, which is twice the increase in marijuana abuse, five times the increase in cocaine abuse, and sixty times

45
The estimate was made from reviewing twenty-four studies involving a
total of 2,507 subjects. David A. Fishbain et al., What Percentage of Chronic Nonmalignant Pain Patients Exposed to Chronic Opioid Analgesic Therapy Develop
Abuse/Addiction and/or Aberrant Drug-Related Behaviors? A Structured EvidenceBased Review, 9 PAIN MED. 444, 444 (2008).
46
An international literature review identifies the range in addiction prevalence for chronic non-malignant patients between 0 percent and 50 percent, while the
prevalence of opioid addiction in cancer treatment between 0 percent and 7.7 percent.
See Jette Højsted & Per Sjøgren, Addiction to Opioids in Chronic Pain Patients: A
Literature Review, 11 EUR. J. PAIN 490, 490 (2007).
47
Id. at 494.
48
Transcript for FDA’s Media Briefing on the Safe Use of Opioids, supra
note 14, at 9.
49
See JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE
ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV. (CASA), UNDER THE COUNTER: THE DIVERSION AND
ABUSE OF CONTROLLED PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN THE U.S., iii (July 2005),
http://www.casacolumbia.org/download.aspx?path=/UploadedFiles/tt3bl4lk.pdf.Opioi
ds are a controlled substance under Schedules I-V of the DEA’s regulatory scheme.
See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2011).
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the increase in heroin abuse.50 Although there are several types of
opioids, the risks appear to be consistent across drug classes. Pain
physicians agree that both extended-release and immediate-release
opioids have a high potential for abuse.51
Creating even greater concern is the possibility that various reporting systems actually underestimate the prevalence of opioid
abuse. For example, the FDA’s Adverse Events Reporting System
(AERS) tracks adverse drug experiences and errors in how drugs are
prescribed.52 Health providers voluntarily participate in reporting data
to this system, while manufacturers are required to participate when
they become aware of an adverse drug event.53 Any system that attempts to collect information on drug abuse likely underestimates its
prevalence because drug abuse is an inherently clandestine activity.54
People may not seek medical care for an adverse event arising out of
drug abuse because they are ashamed of their addiction or afraid of
getting in trouble.55 Subsequently, providers and manufacturers often
never find out about the adverse event and never have an opportunity
to report it. And even if providers treat a patient who experienced an
adverse event, they may not report it to the data collection system,
either because they do not know how to do so or they find it too burdensome. Consequently, the data reflects only what the patients and
providers voluntarily report to the system and what the manufacturers
are aware of and required to report.
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) also
collects data about drug abuse and misuse through the Drug Abuse
Warning Network (DAWN). DAWN tracks drug-related emergency

50

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, NATIONAL CTR. ON ADDICTION &
AT COLUMBIA UNIV. (CASA), supra note 49, at i.
51

SUBSTANCE ABUSE

Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 172.
AERS is a database of information regarding adverse drug events that the
FDA uses to monitor approved drugs and therapeutic biologic products. See Adverse
Event Reporting System (AERS), FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/
AdverseDrugEffects/default.htm (last updated Aug. 20, 2009); The FDA’s definition
of “adverse drug experience” includes “any failure of expected pharmacological
action of the drug.” See FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(b)(1) (2011).
53
See Records and Reports, 21 C.F.R. § 310.305(a) (2011); see also Adverse
Event Reporting System, supra note 52.
54
See John J. Coleman, REMS for Opioids: A Review and Critique, 37
PHARMACY PRACTICE NEWS 42, 43 (2010). Many states also have their own data
collection and reporting system; the systems provide limited value because they are
often not capable of sharing data between states. See also Trescot, supra note 28, at
9.
55
See Coleman, supra note 54, at 43.
52
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admissions and drug-related deaths at both a local and national level.56
The data is collected from emergency departments and coroners’ offices in thirteen metropolitan areas around the country.57 The extent
of data collection, however, is dependent on the ability of DAWN’s
staff to recruit and secure hospital participation in the program.58 Another limitation of DAWN’s data collection is that the areas where
opioid abuse appears to be most prevalent are not necessarily the same
places where DAWN collects data. Southeastern and western states
are home to the teenagers most likely to abuse prescription pain relievers, but these states are not well-represented by the metropolitan
areas targeted under DAWN.59 Realizing the limitations of national
data collection systems is important for properly analyzing data,
which will be used to develop the next general opioid REMS proposal.
5.

Financial Impact of Opioid Abuse and Misuse

Without prompt changes to the current opioid regulatory scheme,
opioid abuse will continue to place an enormous financial burden on
society. Opioid abusers accrue medical expenses at a significantly
higher rate than non-abusers.60 In 2003, the annual direct cost of
health care for an opioid abuser was on average $15,884, compared to
$1,830 for a non-abuser.61 This estimate does not account for indirect
costs, such as the loss of productivity, caused by drug abuse and subsequent illness.62 When the researchers controlled for health care
56

The Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 290aa-4) granted the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) the authority to
collect data through DAWN. See ED Reference Guide, DAWN, 2 (Jan. 2009),
https://dawninfo.samhsa.gov/files/collect_2009-2011/ed_reference_guide_20092011.pdf. SAMHSA is associated with the U.S. Department of Health & Human
Services. Id.
57
The areas include Boston, Chicago, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Miami/Ft.
Lauderdale, Minneapolis, New Orleans, New York Boroughs, Phoenix, San Diego,
San Francisco, and Seattle. Id. at 3.
58
See id. at 1.
59
The states with the highest percentages of teenagers (12-17 years of age)
using prescription pain relievers for non-medical purposes are: Arkansas (10.3 percent), Kentucky (9.8 percent), Montana (9.6 percent), Oregon (9.3 percent), Oklahoma (9.1 percent), Tennessee (8.9 percent), and West Virginia (8.9 percent). Manchikanti, supra note 26, at 404.
60
See Alan G. White et al., Direct Costs of Opioid Abuse in an Insured
Population in the United States, 11 J. MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 469, 473 (2005)
(finding that the average direct cost of health care for 740 opioid abusers was more
than 8 times higher than those of non-abusers).
61
Id.
62
Id. at 475.
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costs associated with the subjects’ comorbidities, they found that the
direct cost of health care for drug abusers still exceeded non-abusers
by at least 1.8 times.63 The escalated cost of health care for drug
abusers is attributable to a higher frequency of hospitalizations and
emergency room visits.64
Once individuals begin to comprehend the direct health care costs
associated with opioid abuse, they may impulsively blame the patients
who abuse and misuse opioids. Media outlets often fuel this view,
disparaging celebrity drug abusers as individuals intentionally deciding to use drugs in harmful and irresponsible ways.65 Yet, as our understanding of drug abuse develops, it appears that drug abuse problems in pain patients often develop unintentionally.66 For example,
consider the testimony of Betty Tully, a patient who suffered from
back pain.
I am a formerly diagnosed chronic pain patient who was misprescribed large amounts of opiates . . . . I went to the doctor for
help with my back pain. I got little else than narcotics,67 along
with a devastating addiction. I was also not aware that many doctors have as little as 12 hours [of] education in narcotic pharmacology, yet receive licenses to prescribe every scheduled drug
manufactured and virtually no restrictions on practices.68
Several factors may have contributed to this patient’s addiction,
including the doctor’s limited training in prescribing opioids and the
patient’s poor understanding of opioid risks. In 2007, these shortcomings likely encouraged Congress to pass the FDAAA. As the FDA
works on developing the next opioid REMS proposal, it should continue to discuss issues such as physician training and patient education. Patients like Betty Tully are not drug addicts looking for an opportunity to get high. Regulatory solutions should encourage doctors
to treat patients like Betty Tully with respect and help them access
safe pain relief.

63

Id.
Id.
65
See e.g., Randal C. Archibold, Charges Against Jackson’s Doctors Are
Expected Monday, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2010, at A11; see also Party and Punishment,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 24, 2010, at 18.
66
See Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 45-47.
67
The term “narcotics” can refer to addictive drugs that bind to opiate receptorsor
to
any
illicit
substance.
Narcotics,
DEA,
http://www.justice.gov/dea/concern/narcotics.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
68
Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 45-47.
64
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Opioid Diversion

Another common problem associated with opioids is known as
diversion, which in the drug context refers to “any criminal act that
causes controlled prescription drugs to be sidetracked from their lawful (medical) purpose to illicit use.”69 Through diversion, third parties
become subject to the same risks of abuse and misuse as patients receiving the drugs directly from doctors. In fact, third parties may be
even more susceptible to the risks because they are not taking the
drugs under the careful supervision of a health care professional.
Surprisingly, only a limited number of doctors are educated about
the problem of drug diversion during their medical training. The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University (CASA) reported that only 19.1 percent of 979 doctors surveyed
had training in medical school about prescription drug diversion and
only 39.2 percent received training about it in their residency program.70 Experienced doctors, however, are often more aware of the
problems that diversion creates. They encounter diversion in the form
of “doctor shopping,” which means that a patient sees multiple doctors concurrently to obtain several prescriptions for pain medication.71
They also see patients who try to acquire pain prescriptions by lying
or misleading doctors through dishonest claims of acute or chronic
pain.72 Additionally, pharmacists encounter patients who attempt to
fill prescriptions with forged or altered prescription forms.73
While drug diversion is generally thought of as patient-initiated, a
small segment of doctors help perpetuate the criminal activity. The
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has led several successful
criminal investigations of doctors suspected of facilitating drug diversion.74 Courts have convicted doctors on charges such as “criminal
conspiracy to commit delivery of or possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance.”75 Since the DEA and a growing number
of state licensure boards have jurisdiction over this issue,76 drug diversion facilitated by doctors was not likely a prominent regulatory goal
69

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, NATIONAL CTR. ON ADDICTION &
AT COLUMBIA UNIV. (CASA), supra note 49, at 45.
70

SUBSTANCE ABUSE

Id. at 6.
Id. at 45.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
See e.g., Cases Against Doctors, DEA, 2 (May 20, 2011),
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/crim_admin_actions/doctors_criminal_cases.pdf.
75
Id.
76
See e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2011); Standards for the Use of Controlled
Substances for the Treatment of Pain, FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 64B8-9.013(1)(d) (2011).
71
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of the FDAAA. Nonetheless, diversion remains an important part of
how patients and third parties gain access to opioids for nonmedical
purposes. Thus, diversion should be a part of FDA discussions about
interpreting the FDAAA and developing the next opioid REMS proposal.
C.

Undertreatment of Pain

Another major problem associated with opioids is undertreatment
of pain. Undertreatment typically arises when a doctor either declines
to write an opioid prescription or writes a prescription that is too weak
to alleviate the patient’s pain.77 Undertreatment is common in acute
pain patients, especially those with cancer.78 The underlying explanation for undertreatment is “opiophobia,” which is defined as “excessive concern about the addictive potential and side effects of narcotics.”79
A doctor’s willingness to prescribe opioids may be subconsciously influenced by several factors. Some medical studies suggest
that a patient’s race closely correlates with whether they will receive a
prescription for opioids in the emergency room.80 For example, Hispanics who visit the emergency room for a broken bone are less likely
to receive opioid pain relievers than non-Hispanic whites.81 One explanation for this racial bias is that doctors tend to perceive certain
individuals as exaggerating their pain more than others.82 Age is another factor that appears to influence doctors when determining
whether to prescribe opioids to an emergency room patient. One
77

See Deandrea, supra note 43, at 1987.
Id.
79
See Rima J. Oken, Curing Healthcare Providers’ Failure to Administer
Opiates in the Treatment of Severe Pain, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1917, 1932-1940
(2002); Julie A. Steele, Cancer Pain: Its Management Emerges as a Public Health
Issue, 82 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 646, 646 (1990) (quoting Dr. June Dahl, Ph.D., of
the University of Wisconsin Medical School and chair of the Wisconsin Cancer Pain
Initiative).
80
See, e.g., Mark J. Pletcher et al., Trends in Opioid Prescribing by
Race/Ethnicity for Patients Seeking Care in US Emergency Departments, 299 JAMA
70, 70 (2008); Joshua H. Tamayo-Sarver et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in
Emergency Department Analgesic Prescription, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2067 (2003);
Mark A. Hostetler, et al., Parenteral Analgesic and Sedative Use Among ED Patients
in the United States: Combined Results from the National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NHAMCS) 1992-1997, 20 AM. J. EMERGENCY MED. 139, 139
(2002).
81
Pletcher, supra note 80, at 70.
82
Opioid prescribing is just one of several areas of medicine where a patient’s race has been found to influence a doctor’s treatment approach. See Pletcher,
supra note 80, at 76.
78
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study found that patients were significantly less likely to receive a
prescription for opioids, if they were eighty years of age or older.83
The study suggested that this age bias is due to a lack of understanding about how to properly manage pain in elderly patients.84
Fears of legal liability for prescribing opioids may also influence
a doctor’s medical decision making. Doctors likely consider the potential consequences of civil sanctions from the DEA85 or the potential
loss of their medical license, if disciplined by the state medical
board.86 Additionally, doctors may fear potential criminal sanctions
imposed by local, state, or federal authorities for inappropriately prescribing opioids.87 Prescribing guidelines issued by organizations
such as the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) have tried to
address these concerns by stating that “[p]hysicians should not fear
disciplinary action from the Board for ordering, prescribing, dispensing or administering controlled substances, including opioid analgesics, for a legitimate medical purpose and in the course of professional
practice.”88 Some courts have even held doctors liable for undertreating a patient’s pain. In the past decade, plaintiffs have brought successful cases against doctors who denied necessary pain medication to
prison inmates and nursing home patients.89
The problem of undertreatment, however, is not a widely recognized problem. Critics argue that undertreatment is only a perception
83

Kevin M. Terrell et al., Analgesic Prescribing for Patients who are Discharged from an Emergency Department, 11 PAIN MED. 1072, 1076 (2010).
84
Id.
85
The DEA has authority to enforce civil penalties up to $25,000 for violating controlled substance registration requirements such as documentation. See e.g.,
21 U.S.C. § 842(c) (2011).
86
See, e.g., Disciplinary Guidelines, FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 64B8-8.001(2)
(2011).
87
For example, the DEA has authority to enforce criminal penalties of imprisonment not exceeding four years on individuals who try to use a fictitious or
revoked DEA registration number to acquire or obtain controlled substances. See 21
U.S.C. § 843(d) (2011).
88
Model Guidelines for the Use of Controlled Substances for the Treatment
of Pain, supra note 31, at 3.
89
See, e.g., Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1040-41 (2002) (remanding
the case to the district court because the court thought that a nurse and a doctor should
not have refused to provide Walker pain medication); Sasser v. Ryder Truck
Rental, No. 2:06cv593-CSC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160, at *23, 33 (M.D. Ala. Jan.
2, 2008) (finding plaintiff, who was not an inmate, failed to provide sufficient evidence showing that his employer was systematically trying to cut him off from necessary medical treatment, which included a pain prescription for oxycontin); Kathryn
Tucker, Medico-Legal Case Report and Commentary: Inadequate Pain Management
in the Context of Terminal Cancer. The Case of Lester Tomlinson, 5 PAIN MED. 214
(2004) (discussing Tomlinson v. Bayberry Care Ctr., No. C-02-00120 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Contra Costa County 2003)).
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and not a reality.90 They argue that the alleged racial bias actually
results from doctors over-prescribing opioids to one racial group and
prescribing appropriate levels of opioids to another.91 Their explanation is that emergency room doctors have less experience recognizing
signs of abuse in white patients compared to other racial groups.92
Despite these criticisms, undertreatment is well-documented in research studies and litigation against doctors, both of which provide
sufficient justification for addressing undertreatment of pain in the
next opioid REMS proposal.
II.

CHANGES TO FDA AUTHORITY
A.

FDA Authority Prior to the FDAAA

The FDA has traditionally acted as the “gate keeper” for approving prescription drugs, including opioids.93 Congress specifically
tasked the FDA with regulating the safety of food, human and veterinary drugs, medical devices, and cosmetics.94 With respect to drugs,
the FDA controls over-the-counter and prescription drug approvals,
labeling, and manufacturing standards.95 The FDA enforces these
standards by regulating manufacturers because they are responsible
for developing, packaging, and distributing the drugs.96 The FDA’s
authority to regulate drugs does not extend to illegal substances such
as cocaine and heroin because these substances are under the jurisdiction of the DEA.97
The scope of the FDA’s authority to regulate drugs is expansive
when compared to the narrow scope of the DEA’s authority to regulate drug diversion. While the FDA regulates drug approval, labeling, marketing, and use, the DEA focuses on prescription and distribu90

See Pletcher, supra note 80, at 76.
Id.
92
Id.
93
See Andrew C. von Eschenbach, M.D., Comm’r of Food and Drugs, FDA
at a Turning Point: Meeting the Challenge of a Rapidly Changing World, Speech
Before the National Press Club (Feb. 29, 2008), available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm051551.htm (last visited Oct. 4,
2011).
94
See generally Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399
(2011).
95
See id. § 355.
96
The laws regarding the FDA’s authority, specifically the drug approval
process, allows the FDA to regulate manufacturers. See FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355-1
(2011).
97
Heroin is in Schedule II(a)(1)-(3) and cocaine is in Schedule II(a)(4). See
21 U.S.C. § 812 (2011).
91
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tion.98 The roles of these agencies, however, have created some overlap of authority. When the DEA is deciding how to schedule a certain
drug,99 the FDA makes scientific recommendations to the DEA about
the drug’s abuse potential, which the FDA discovers through clinical
studies required during the drug approval process.100
The FDA’s scope of authority has gradually expanded during the
last two decades. In 1992, Congress gave the FDA the authority to
charge drug manufacturers fees for seeking drug approval through the
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA).101 Congress wanted the
FDA to use the fees to hire more staff and expedite the drug approval
process.102 Every five years PDUFA is eligible for reauthorization,103
and each time, Congress has reauthorized it.104
In 2006, Congress authorized the FDA to require RiskMAPs as
part of the drug approval process. A RiskMAP consisted of a written
risk evaluation of a proposed drug, completed by the manufacturer.105
The authorization from Congress came after the FDA stated in its
guidance to the pharmaceutical industry that there was a need to assess and minimize risks associated with prescription drugs.106 The
98
See Oxycontin and Beyond: Examining the Role of FDA and DEA in Regulating Prescription Painkillers, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs
of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform 109th Cong., U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, 2 (Sept.
13,
2005),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg24947/pdf/CHRG109hhrg24947.pdf.
99
Scheduling refers to the level of regulation DEA applies to the distribution
and prescription of a certain drug. There are five drug schedules where Schedule I
contains the most dangerous and highly-regulated drugs and Schedule V contains the
least dangerous and minimally-regulated drugs. See id. at 5-6.
100
When deciding how to schedule a drug, the DEA considers the drug’s
potential for abuse, patterns of actual abuse including scope and duration, scientific
evidence, risks to public health, psychological or physiological effect of addiction,
and relation to drugs already controlled by the DEA. See 21 U.S.C. § 811(c) (2011).
101
See 21 U.S.C. § 379(h) (2011); see also Cameron Rhudy, How Congress
May Have Failed Consumers with the Food and Drug Administration Amendments
Act of 2007, 27 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 99, 99-100 (2008).
102
See Rhudy, supra note 101, at 99-100.
103
Id. at 100.
104
The most recent PDUFA reauthorization occurred in 2007 under the Food
and Drug Administration Act, which granted $29.3 million towards improving the
drug approval process. Id. at 103.
105
See Kathryn Foxhall, FDA Considers Making Changes to RiskMAPs,
DRUG
TOPICS
(July
23,
2007),
http://drugtopics.modernmedicine.com/drugtopics/Safety/FDA-considers-makingchanges-to-RiskMAPs/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/442605 (last visited Oct. 4,
2011).
106
FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD PHARMACOVIGILANCE PRACTICES
AND PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGIC ASSESSMENT 2-3 (Mar. 2005), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM126834.pdf.
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FDA described risk management as a process of steps by which a
manufacturer (1) assesses the risk-benefit of a product, (2) develops
and implements tools to minimize risk, (3) evaluates the effectiveness
of the tools, and (4) makes adjustments to further assess the riskbenefit balance.107 The tools that the FDA allowed under RiskMAPs
to reduce abuse included a process to screen patients for drug appropriateness, a higher standard of documentation, patient education requirements, patient and provider registration requirements, and mandatory lab tests.108 Despite criticisms that RiskMAPs sacrificed efficiency in the drug approval process, RiskMAPs became the precursor
for Risk Evaluation Mitigation Strategies, otherwise known as
REMS.109
B.

FDA Authority After the FDAAA

In 2007, Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration
Amendment Act (FDAAA), which gave the FDA greater authority to
regulate prescription drugs, including prescription pain relievers
known as opioids.110 The FDAAA is considered to be “the most profound reworking of the U.S. drug regulatory framework in half a century.”111 For the first time, the FDA had the authority to extensively
regulate drugs after the drug approval process.112
1.

General Overview of REMS Content

In Title IX of the FDAAA, Congress gave the FDA the authority
to require Risk Evaluation Mitigation Strategies (REMS) as part of
every drug application.113 It also gave the FDA the discretion to de-

107

Id. at 2.
See Foxhall, supra note 105.
109
See Henry I. Miller & David R. Henderson, The FDA’s Risky RiskAversion, POL’Y REV., Oct.-Nov. 2007, at 6, 20-21.
110
See FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355-1 (2011).
111
Barbara Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 419, 419 (2010).
112
See FDAAA § 355-1.
113
There is some overlap in the regulatory approaches of RiskMAPs and
REMS. There is some overlap in the regulatory approaches of RiskMAPs and REMS.
FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: FORMAT AND CONTENT OF PROPOSED RISK
EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES (REMS), REMS ASSESSMENTS, AND
PROPOSED REMS MODIFICATIONS (DRAFT) 2-4 (2009), available at
www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidan
ces/UCM184128.pdf. The FDA explained in a draft for an industry guidance report
that the principles included in RiskMAPs have essentially become the same principles
108
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cide what types of risk mitigation strategies drug manufacturers
should incorporate into their REMS.114 The FDAAA organized
REMS strategies into three tiers so that the FDA could apply less burdensome strategies to drugs with the least severe health risks and
more burdensome strategies to drugs associated with the most severe
health risks.
The least burdensome mitigation strategy consists of a series of
assessments by which the manufacturer evaluates its drug’s risks at
eighteen months, three years, and seven years after receiving drug
approval from the FDA.115 The Secretary of DHHS can waive the
assessment at seven years, if she believes that the drug’s risks were
adequately assessed at three years.116 However, if the FDA feels that
the minimal strategy is insufficient based on the potential risks associated with the drug, it can require the manufacturer to comply with
additional strategies.
The middle-tier mitigation strategy consists of programs developed by the manufacturers for the purpose of educating providers and
patients about a drug’s risks through medication guides, package inserts, and/or a communication plan.117 Since 2007, the FDA has required medication guides in all REMS and has required communication plans in some.118 A medication guide identifies important information about a drug’s known and potential risks.119 The guides are
given to each patient who receives the drug. 120 They are also available to patients and health care providers on the internet.121 Similarly,
a communication plan is a packet of information that manufacturers
send to health care providers within sixty days of drug approval and
includes a “Dear Healthcare Provider Letter” explaining that the purpose of the information is to make them aware of the drug’s potential
used in REMS, except REMS expands the scope of potential strategies that the FDA
can require to mitigate risk. Id. at 3-4.
114
Id. at 2-3.
115
See FDAAA § 355-1(d).
116
Id.
117
Id. § 355-1(e).
118
See Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsa
ndProviders/ucm111350.htm (last updated Oct. 6, 2011).
119
See Content and Format of a Medication Guide, 21 C.F.R. § 208.20(b)(6)
(2011); see e.g., Acterma Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS), FDA, 13
(Oct.
26,
2010),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationf
orPatientsandProviders/UCM202044.pdf [hereinafter Acterma].
120
See Content and Format of a Medication Guide, supra note 119.
121
See generally Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies
(REMS), supra note 118.
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and known risks.122 The packet contains copies of the medication
guide and the professional label that will accompany the drug after
approval.123
For drugs that the FDA finds inherently dangerous, it may require
manufacturers to comply with the highest tier of risk management.
This mitigation strategy, which is the most burdensome, is known as
Elements to Assure Safe Use (ETASU).124 The Secretary determines
that manufacturers should comply with ETASUs when (1) their drug
has been associated with adverse drug experiences, (2) the FDA
would deny or withdraw the drug’s approval without ETASUs, and
(3) the risks of the drug are not adequately mitigated by the basic
strategies.125 Under ETASUs, the FDA may require manufacturers to
develop drug training and special certification examinations, designate
specific drug dispensing locations, increase documentation of safe
use, implement patient monitoring, and encourage patient enrollment
in a drug-specific registry.126
Since 2007, the FDA has required some combination of ETASUs
in 20 of the 146 approved REMS.127 For example, the FDA approved
Butrans (buprenorphine), an opioid administered through a patch
placed on the patient’s skin for managing moderate to severe chronic
pain.128 Before granting drug approval, the FDA required the manufacturer, Purdue Pharma L.P., to create a REMS with the ETASU of
special training for health care providers.129 The manufacturer developed a training program that provided general guidance on opioid use

122
123
124
125
126
127

See FDAAA § 355-1(e)(3); see Acterma, supra note 119, at 2.
See Acterma, supra note 119, at 10.
See FDAAA § 355-1(f)(3).
See id. § 355-1(f)(1)(A)-(B).
Id. § 355-1(f)(3)(A)-(F); see infra Part III.B.
See Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), supra

note 118.

128

Butrans: Full Prescribing Information, PURDUE PHARM., 1 (June 2011),
http://www.purduepharma.com/pi/prescription/ButransPI.pdf.
Even though Buprenorphine is an opioid, it has become a popular drug used to treat opioid addictions
because it has lower abuse potential and has been associated with mild withdrawal
symptoms. Clinical Guidelines for the Use of Buprenorphine in the Treatment of
Opioid
Addiction,
SAMSHA,
6
(2004),
http://buprenorphine.samhsa.gov/Bup_Guidelines.pdf.
129
Since the FDA has not decided on a standard opioid REMS, the FDA has
required REMS with ETASUs on an ad hoc basis as manufacturers have presented
opioids for drug approval. See PURDUE PHARMA L.P., Butrans: Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation
Strategy
(REMS),
2
(June
30,
2010),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationf
orPatientsandProviders/UCM220880.pdf.
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and specific advice about appropriate patient selection and abuse risks
associated with Butrans.130
Because opioids are associated with adverse drug events that the
FDA believes cannot be mitigated by less burdensome strategies, the
FDA has approved opioids such as Butrans with a REMS containing
ETASUs.131 However, each time an opioid has come up for approval
since 2007, the FDA has developed a new REMS by modifying the
required ETASUs. Under the current opioid approval process, the
FDA reviews an application, decides what combination of ETASUs to
require, and notifies the manufacturer of its decision. This process is
labor intensive for FDA employees and makes the drug approval
process very inefficient. For manufacturers, the current process significantly delays their ability to put the drug on the market. Delays
cause lost revenue that could have been used to fund further research
and development of new drugs.132
If the FDA used the same REMS for all opioid drug applications,
it would not only improve the efficiency of the FDA’s drug approval
process, it would improve manufacturer compliance with the requirements. Under a general opioid REMS process, manufacturers would
be able to better anticipate the FDA’s expectations.133 If manufacturers knew what type of REMS they had to complete in order to acquire
drug approval for an opioid, they could contact the individuals necessary to help them complete the REMS in advance of drug approval.134
These individuals may be scattered across the organization, so having
advance notice would prevent delays caused by tracking them down
and coordinating their participation.135 Furthermore, a general opioid
REMS would allow manufacturers to ask for clarification of any requirement. Recognizing the benefits to manufacturers and the drug
approval process, the FDA began drafting a general opioid REMS
proposal. Unfortunately, the FDA has encountered difficulty developing a widely-accepted proposal.136

130

Id.
Id.
132
See id. at 3.
133
Dealing With REMS Challenges in Drug Commercialization,
PHARMACEUTICAL
COMMERCE,
1
(Aug.
19,
2009),
http://www.mckesson.com/static_files/McKesson.com/McKSpecialty/PDFs/REMS%
20article%20reprint-8-09.pdf.
134
Id. at 2.
135
Id. at 2-3.
136
See infra Part II.B.2.
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Initial Opioid REMS Proposal

The FDA did not present a proposal for a general opioid REMS
until July 22, 2010, at the Joint Meeting between the Anesthetic and
Life Support Drugs Advisory Committee and the Drug Safety and
Risk Management Advisory Committee (Joint Meeting).137 The delay
between approval of the FDAAA and the FDA’s first opioid REMS
proposal is likely explained by the medical complexity of opioids and
the widespread disagreement about how to design an opioid REMS.138
Also, the FDA likely wanted to proceed cautiously because of the
potentially high financial burden an opioid REMS would place on key
stakeholders in the pharmaceutical and health care industries.139
Manufacturers will experience financial burdens when the FDA requires them to create and offer training programs to health care providers prescribing their drugs. This is in addition to the financial burden manufacturers have already had to incur because of REMS requirements associated with nonopioids. Similarly, health care providers will experience financial burdens when they attend the training
programs rather than spend time with patients.
The FDA first announced its plan to create an opioid REMS on
February 6, 2009, with a letter to opioid manufacturers.140 During the
first six months of 2009, the FDA created an Industry Working Group
comprised of pharmaceutical industry representatives to discuss and
develop an opioid REMS.141 In the following months, the FDA
granted drug approval to two new opioids, indicating that when the
FDA finalizes an opioid REMS, the manufacturers may have to revise
their current REMS in order to comply with future policy changes.142
In December 2009, the FDA invited key stakeholders to work on de-

137

See generally Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 1.
Id.
139
Id.
140
See Transcript for FDA’s Media Briefing on the Safe Use of Opioids,
supra note 14, at 2.
141
See, e.g., Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies for Certain Opioid
Drugs; Notice of Public Meeting, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,568, 59,568 (Nov. 18, 2009). A
special exception was made to antitrust laws to enable many significant stake holders
of the pharmaceutical industry to meet with each other. See Coleman, supra note 54,
at 42.
142
In July 2009, the FDA approved Onsolis, a short-acting opioid, to manage
pain in cancer patients. Then, in August 2009, the FDA approved Embeda, a longacting opioid, for moderate to severe pain. See Current State of Opioid Drug Approvals, FDA,
www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm187976.htm (last
updated Nov. 20, 2009).
138
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veloping the first opioid REMS proposal.143 Six months later, however, at the Joint Meeting, the advisory committees voted to reject the
initial opioid REMS proposal because it required “more teeth.”144
The initial proposal for opioid REMS consisted of a medication
guide, communication plan, and the ETASU of additional voluntary
training for health care providers.145 The medication guide was intended as the primary form of education for health care providers who
prescribe the opioid, and patients who receive the prescription.146
Before this proposal, there were several medication guides used by
drug manufacturers of opioids.147 The initial opioid REMS proposal
recommended that manufacturers and the FDA work to consolidate
some of the preexisting medication guides. After the consolidation
effort, manufacturers would have at their disposal a standard medication guide for each of the following: oral long-acting opioids, transdermal patch long-acting opioids, and tablet and oral solutions of
methadone hydrochloride.148
In addition to the medication guide, the initial opioid REMS proposal required a communication plan.149 No specific alterations were
made to this strategy. Communication plans under the initial proposal
followed the recommendation in the FDAAA, which requires drug
manufacturers to send letters to key stakeholders, including prescribers, dispensers, state licensing authorities, professional associations,
and all other DEA registrants, informing them of the known and potential risks of the drug.150
Finally, the initial proposal recommended that the FDA exercise
its authority to require an ETASU, specifically voluntary training for
health care providers, developed by the manufacturers.151 The train143

See Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies for Certain Opioid Drugs;
Meeting Notice, 74 Fed. Reg. at 59,568.
144
See Joint Meeting of the Anesthetic and Life Support Drugs Advisory
Committee and the Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee; Meeting
Notice, 75 Fed. Reg. at 32,188; see also Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at
232.
145
See generally Industry Working Group Presentation of Risk Evaluation
and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) for Extended-Release and Long-Acting Opioid
Products,
FDA
(July
22-23,
2010),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/ComitteesMeetingMaterials
/Drugs/AnestheticAndLifeSupportDrugsAdvisoryCommittee/UCM220952.pdf [hereinafter Industry Working Group].
146
Id. at 14.
147
See id.
148
Id. at 14-15.
149
Id. at 17.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 23, 25.

HEALTH MATRIX

296

[Vol. 22: 273]

ing would improve prescribers’ ability to select suitable patients and
counsel them on the associated risks.152 The training would also serve
as a reminder that the patient and the prescriber should carefully read
the medication guide.153 The FDA would conduct an ongoing assessment of whether the training was successful.154 The tools used for
detecting changes in opioid prescribing patterns after the implementation of opioid REMS would be database studies and surveillance studies conducted by an external review board called the Sponsor Management Group (SMG).155 If the SMG found that doctors failed to
participate in the training program and their overall prescribing patterns did not change significantly, the FDA would make a recommendation to the DEA about incorporating a training requirement into the
doctors’ DEA registration process.156 Even though the advisory committees rejected the initial opioid REMS proposal, the FDA should
continue to work towards implementing an opioid-specific REMS
because opioids are a unique class of drugs with a high risk for
abuse.157 Through a general opioid REMS, the FDA can help ensure
that the benefits of using opioids for pain relief always outweigh the
risks.158
III.

OPIOID REMS: LEARNING FROM THE PAST AND
IDENTIFYING FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES
A.

Lessons From the Initial Opioid REMS
Proposal
1.

Voluntary Prescriber Training

In the initial proposal, the FDA relied on the ETASU of training
to reduce opioid risks. The FDA included a training program that
would educate prescribers on appropriate patient selection, dosing,
152

Id. at 24.
Id.
154
Id. at 25.
155
The Sponsor Management Group would be an advisory committee created
within the FDA to analyze data and track changes to opioid prescribing patterns. Id. at
39.
156
Id. at 25. The current DEA registration process consists of a written application customized to the applicant based on the purpose for which the applicant will
be handling the controlled substances.
See Registration Procedures, DEA,
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drugreg/process.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
157
See
Background
on
Opioid
REMS,
FDA,
www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm187975.htm
(last
updated Nov. 20, 2009).
158
Id.
153
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and patient monitoring.159 While the information conveyed in the
training program is unquestionably valuable, the FDA’s suggestion of
voluntary training is insufficient to improve prescribing habits.160
Doctors will likely decide against voluntary training, not because they
fail to appreciate the importance of training, but simply because their
demanding schedules do not allow it. If many doctors choose not to
attend the training program, then prescribing habits for opioids will
not improve in a way that reduces opioid abuse, diversion, and undertreatment.
At the Joint Meeting, several speakers suggested that a simple solution to improving the next opioid REMS proposal is to make training mandatory.161 While this seems logical, it is not necessarily feasible, at least for the FDA. The FDA controls drug approval, labeling,
and manufacturing standards by regulating the manufacturers.162 It
does not have regulatory authority over doctors and cannot enforce a
training requirement.163 Since the FDA is unable to single-handedly
improve opioid prescribing habits, it needs help from other regulatory
agencies.
At the federal level, the DEA may be able to assist the FDA by
requiring doctors to complete an opioid training program prior to receiving a DEA registration number.164 A DEA registration number
permits doctors, pharmacists, and distributers to lawfully handle controlled substances.165 The current process requires an applicant to
complete a written application and mail it to the nearest DEA field
office, along with payment for a processing fee.166 In the future, the
DEA could require doctors to show proof that they attended an approved opioid training course as part of the application process. Although this is not an immediate solution to increasing regulation of
prescribers, it has the potential to provide long-term support to the
FDA’s efforts.167
159

See Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 44.
See id. at 29.
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Id. at 29-30.
162
See FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355-1 (2011); see supra Part II.A.
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See FDAAA § 355-1.
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Registration Procedures, supra note 156.
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See
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and
Fees,
DEA,
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drugreg/categories.htm#manufact (last visited
Oct. 4, 2011).
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Registration Procedures, supra note 156.
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DEA involvement in requiring training for doctors prescribing opioids is
not an immediate solution because it would require Congress to pass a law authorizing the DEA to require doctors to attend training before prescribing opioids to patients for pain. Buprenorphine, which is an opioid used to treat people addicted to
drugs, illustrates this process. Congress passed the Drug Addiction Treatment Act of
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At the state level, medical boards may be able to assist the FDA
by requiring doctors to complete continuing medical education on
opioids. The Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) plays an
influential role in medical practice at the state level. It represents seventy professional medical organizations and 750,000 practicing physicians.168 The FSMB has already released professional guidelines for
prescribing opioids, indicating that it recognizes the seriousness of
opioid problems. The FSMB has the ability to persuade state legislatures to include opioid training as part of the medical licensure requirements. Since the manufacturers are responsible for the development and cost of the training programs, changing the state laws to
include an opioid training program would not be a significant financial burden on the states. With the help of state-level regulatory agencies, opioid regulation would extend beyond manufacturers.
While changes may take place in the form of increased FDA collaboration with the DEA and state medical boards, manufacturers
should continue to develop and offer the requisite training programs.
Manufacturers understand their drugs the best. They conduct extensive clinical trials and complete a thorough application process in order to earn drug approval from the FDA.169 Manufacturers can use
information they gathered prior to drug approval to design the training
and can use information they gather postapproval to revise the training
from time to time. Additionally, manufacturers are likely to have the
financial resources to fund ongoing training efforts.
Prescriber training programs developed and implemented by the
manufacturer, however, raise concerns about conflict of interest, specifically that a drug manufacturer will promote its own drug through
information presented in the training program. Critics should realize
that the FDA still has the authority to approve or reject the manufacturer’s proposed training program. In other words, if the FDA finds
that the training is biased towards the manufacturer’s drug, the FDA
2000 (DATA 2000), which gave the DEA the authority to require doctors prescribing
buprenorphine for drug addictions to obtain a special registration number. In order to
get the special registration number, doctors have to meet one of seven requirements to
be a “qualified physician.” See infra Part III.B.1. Once doctors meet the requirements and obtain a registration number, they cannot write a valid opioid prescription
as part of a patient’s addiction treatment unless they include their special registration
number. Congress would have to pass a new law, if the DEA were to apply similar
registration requirements on doctors who prescribe opioids for pain treatment. See
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Servs. Admin., Buprenorphine: Physician
Waiver
Qualifications,
BUPRENORPHINE.SAMHSA.GOV,
http://buprenorphine.samhsa.gov/waiver_qualifications.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2011).
168
See Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 88.
169
FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2011).
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can deny the manufacturer’s drug approval. If the FDA has already
granted drug approval and discovers the manufacturer is presenting
biased information, the FDA can rescind the approval and remove the
manufacturer’s drug from the market.
The FDA could also extend the investigatory framework it applies
to food and drugs to the training programs, which would allow the
FDA to continuously monitor the quality and content of the training
programs offered by manufacturers.170 Through cooperation between
regulatory agencies at the state and federal level, the FDA can improve oversight of information presented to doctors about opioids and
ensure that a manufacturer’s bias does not interfere with a doctor’s
training experience. Monitoring training programs across the country
might be difficult and expensive, if the format of the program is faceto-face instruction. However, if the FDA allows manufacturers to
fulfill the training ETASU by creating an educational platform such as
an interactive website with tutorials and an on-line certification examination, continuous monitoring of a website would be less costly
for the FDA and state officials commissioned to conduct the investigations.171 In addition, a web-based training program would be more
cost effective for manufacturers than a program based on face-to-face
instruction.172
2.

Public Education

The FDA properly included opioid training for prescribers in the
initial proposal, but it failed to address educational opportunities for

170

For continuous regulation of approved foods and drugs, the FDA relies on
help from the states because the states share jurisdiction over the products located
within their boundaries. Individuals who conduct examinations, inspections and
investigations for the FDA are either: (1) FDA employees recognized by the state as
an agent or special representative; or (2) a state regulatory officials commissioned by
the FDA. See FDA, CHAPTER 3: FEDERAL AND STATE COOPERATION, INVESTIGATIONS
OPERATIONS
MANUAL
92-93
(2011),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/IOM/default.htm.
Commissioned officials
conduct inspections, collect samples, copy and verify records, and review official
FDA documents. The FDA believes that this system enhances cooperation between
state and federal agencies on regulatory matters and “increas[es] the amount of public
health protection afforded to the American consumer.” FDA, CHAPTER 3:
COMMISSIONING AND WORK SHARING, REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL 2, 6 (Aug.
2011),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresMa
nual/UCM074334.pdf.
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See infra Part IV.A.
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See infra Part IV.A.
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the general public.173 Speakers at the Joint Meeting described the
difference between training and education by explaining that training
focuses on helping health care providers properly diagnose patients,
dispense drugs, and monitor patients, whereas education focuses on
communicating drug risks to doctors, patients, and the general public.174
The FDA should not initially require manufacturers to fund public
education campaigns about opioids. Manufacturers have limited resources and must maintain adequate funds for drug research, development, and manufacturing. The FDA should only ask manufacturers
to spend money on developing mandatory training for prescribers.
Training has the greatest chance of improving opioid prescribing patterns and reducing opioid-related problems of abuse, diversion, and
undertreatment. Public education campaigns should be left to nonprofit organizations, such as the American Pain Foundation (APF), at
least until manufacturers have absorbed the start-up cost associated
with developing training programs for prescribers.
The American Pain Foundation has the ability to educate the general public on the risks of opioid treatment.175 The APF communicates safety alerts to consumers and serves as a liaison to policymakers about drug-related issues.176 It recently called its members to take
action against irresponsible, biased reports on opioid abuse within the
population of wounded American soldiers.177 Since the APF already
conveys messages about drug risks and calls people to take action
against issues such as drug abuse, it can play an important role in educating the public about safe opioid use.178
3.

Drug Diversion

The initial proposal fell short of providing strategies to reduce
drug diversion. While drug diversion falls under the jurisdiction of
173
174

tion).

175
176

4, 2011).

See Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 30-32.
See id. at 27-28 (regarding training); see also id. at 30 (regarding educaSee id. at 43.
AM. PAIN FOUND., http://www.painfoundation.org/about (last visited Oct.

177
The APF pointed to an article published in USA Today saying that the
newspaper misrepresented the prevalence of opioid abuse in soldiers by indicating up
to 35 percent of wounded soldiers have become addicted to drugs. Action Requested,
A M.
PAIN
FOUND.,
http://action.painfoundation.org/site/MessageViewer?em_id=12681.0&printer_friendl
y=1 (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
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Id.
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the DEA, the FDA could have required a strategy within the opioid
REMS proposal to help the DEA reduce the availability of drugs to
third parties seeking to misuse and abuse opioids. One recommendation that came out of the Joint Meeting was to create a program for
collecting unused opioids.179 Unused or improperly disposed opioids
increase the risk that a third party will misuse or even abuse the drugs.
The FDA could designate places in hospitals to collect unused drugs
as part of the REMS.180 Including more robust strategies such as this
may help persuade the FDA advisory committees to approve a future
opioid REMS proposal.
4.

Data Collection

While the initial proposal provided that ongoing assessments by
the SMG will evaluate the efficacy of an opioid REMS, especially the
impact of training, the initial proposal did not explain how the SMG
will function.181 The FDA left the areas of data collection, assessments, and information sharing undeveloped. Some of the unanswered questions related to data collection and assessments include
(1) what type of data will the SMG collect, (2) will the SMG publicly
report the data, and (3) if not, who will see the reports?
In determining the role of the SMG, the FDA should look to several states that gather data in prescription drug monitoring programs
(PMPs). PMPs are electronic databases that store information about
what drugs doctors and pharmacists dispense to patients.182 Fortythree states have laws creating PMPs, and thirty-four states have operational programs.183 Most programs are managed by state health
departments.184 Individuals who can request data from PMPs include
(1) licensed physicians; (2) pharmacists; (3) federal, state, and local
law enforcement; (4) professional organizations; (5) regulatory
boards; and (6) anyone whose prescription has been recorded in the
database.185
Massachusetts is representative of most PMPs because it allows
monitoring of drugs that fall into Schedules II, III, and IV of the
179

See Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 138.
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See Industry Working Group, supra note 145; see supra Part II.B.2.
182
Nat’l Alliance for Model State Drug Laws, Prescription Drug Monitoring
Programs: A Brief Overview, NAMSDL.ORG 1, (Aug. 17, 2010),
http://www.namsdl.org/documents/PMPsBriefOverview8-17-2010.pdf.
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DEA’s classification for controlled substances.186 Massachusetts’
PMP is funded in part by grants from the U.S. Department of Justice.187 It requires that pharmacies report to a data collection agency
each week and no later than ten days after filling a prescription.188
Data points that must be sent to the agency include customer identification numbers, locations where customers filled prescriptions, the
customer’s relation to the patient if they are not the same individual,
and quantities of the drugs dispensed.189 Since most state laws permit
PMPs to share data with law enforcement and regulatory agencies,190
the FDA and the SMG should strongly consider using PMP data to
monitor changes in opioid prescribing habits.
5.

Pilot Study

The FDA should also consider conducting a pilot study for the
next opioid REMS proposal prior to its approval. The goal of the
study would be to simulate the implementation of opioid REMS using
one manufacturer seeking drug approval for a new opioid drug. The
study would allow the FDA to work out any unanticipated difficulties
in having the manufacturer offer prescriber training programs. It
would also allow the FDA to receive feedback from doctors who attend the opioid training programs. Doctors would be able to critique
whether the information was valuable and whether it was presented in
an appropriate manner. A pilot study would help the FDA work out
any glitches before requiring a large-scale implementation of the
opioid REMS.

186

Id. at 3. Effective January 1, 2011 the record keeping for prescriptions
expanded to drugs regulated by Schedule II-V. See Massachusetts Department of
Public Health Prescription Monitoring Program Fact Sheet for Pharmacy, MASS.GOV
(Oct.
13,
2010),
http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/dph/quality/drugcontrol/pmp_pharmacy_factshee
t.pdf .
187
Prescription Monitoring Program (PMP), MASS.GOV (Oct. 30, 2010),
http://www.mass.gov, (click on link for “State Government,” then “Alphabetical List,
All Branches,” then “Executive Office of Health and Human Services,” then tab
called “For Providers,” then “Certification, Licensure, and Registration,” then “Compliance and Enforcement,” then “Drug Control,” then “Prescription Monitoring Program”).
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See Massachusetts Department of Public Health Prescription Monitoring
Program Fact Sheet for Pharmacy, supra note 186.
189
Additional data points include information about whether prescription
partially filled, method of payment, electronic prescription reference number, whether
patient is resident of the U.S., and whether prescription is compounded. Id. at 2-4.
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See Nat’l Alliance for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 182, at 4.
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Congress did not give express authority to the FDA through the
FDAAA to conduct a pilot study of an opioid REMS before implementing it across the entire class of opioids.191 At the Joint Meeting,
an FDA representative pointed out that conducting a pilot study for
opioid REMS would be difficult without explicit statutory authority.192 Rather than proposing new legislation, the FDA should reallocate money within its budget to fund the pilot study and seek voluntary participation by one or more drug manufacturers. If attempts to
do this are unsuccessful, the FDA should consider looking at risk
management programs created by the states.193 However, one drawback to looking at state programs is that the FDA may not have the
opportunity to observe the efficacy of specific ETASUs, if the states
observed have not taken an approach modeled after ETASUs.194
B.

Opportunities Under the FDAAA

The FDA advisory committee rejected the initial opioid REMS
proposal because it only included voluntary training for prescribers,
which is one of six ETASUs available to the FDA under the highest
risk mitigation strategy.195 At first glance, it looks as though the FDA
could have included more ETASUs in the first opioid REMS proposal. However, the following subsections describe the extent to
which the FDA can incorporate ETASUs in the next opioid REMS
proposal.
1.

Certification

Under the FDAAA, the FDA can ask manufacturers to create certification programs for pharmacists, doctors, and health care facilities.196 If the FDA required manufacturers to develop a certification
examination as part of an opioid REMS, health care professionals
would have to complete the examination before prescribing and dis-
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See Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 206.
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Id. at 39.
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See John F. Peppin, Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS): A
Short Critique: Some Problems with REMS, MEDSCAPE TODAY (July 23, 2010),
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/725604_2.
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pensing opioids.197 Certification is a tool, similar to training, which
can improve the competency of health care professionals regarding
the risks of opioid use. However, if the FDA exercises its authority to
implement a special drug certification program, it would duplicate
some preexisting DEA requirements for doctors who treat patients
with drug addictions.
Under DEA regulations, doctors who wish to treat patients addicted to opioids must first meet the standards of a “qualifying physician.”198 They can meet that standard by completing one of the following: (1) state board certification in the addiction psychiatry subspecialty, (2) addiction certification from the Society of Addiction
Medicine, (3) American Osteopathic Association board certification in
the addiction medicine subspecialty, (4) eight or more hours of training from a professional medical organization, (5) participation in a
clinical trial that led to drug approval, (6) sufficient training as specified by a state medical licensing board, or (7) any other training that
the Secretary of DHHS finds sufficient to show that a physician is
competent to prescribe opioids to patients.199
Given the similarity between the DEA’s requirements for qualifying physicians and the FDA’s potential authority under the certification ETASU, the FDA would duplicate some of the DEA’s efforts.
The overlap would occur in the case of doctors who treat patients currently addicted to opioids. While this would not affect all doctors,
duplication in this subset of health care providers would force some
doctors to spend twice as much time and money on certification.
Over the long-term, this could deter some doctors from prescribing
opioids, which would limit patient access to pain relief and cause
widespread undertreatment of acute and chronic pain. It might also
deter some doctors from treating patients addicted to opioids, which
would be equally problematic.
Duplication could be avoided if the Secretary of DHHS recognizes that the FDA certification program satisfies the DEA requirements under subsection (7) of the qualifying physician standard.
However, the Secretary has not yet addressed whether opioid training
developed by a manufacturer for a REMS would fall within the scope
of subsection (7). Conversely, the Secretary has also not addressed
whether the DEA’s qualifying physician standard could satisfy the
197

Id.
The DEA requires doctors to have special certification to treat patients
addicted to opioids because typical treatment involves drugs like methadone and
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certification ETASU and save manufacturers from developing a new
system of certification.
2.

Dispensing Locations

The FDA can also impose limitations on drug dispensing locations.200 The FDA has not addressed this ETASU in great detail during public meetings on opioid REMS.201 Without more information, it
is difficult to know how the FDA would implement this ETASU to
reduce the risks of abuse, undertreatment, and diversion. Limiting
opioid dispensing locations has the potential to mitigate the risk of
diversion by further controlling who receives opioids. Since the
DEA’s primary concern is regulating the diversion of drugs for illicit
use, this ETASU is more relevant to the DEA’s mission than the
FDA’s objectives. Thus, the FDA should focus its efforts on incorporating other ETASUs into the next opioid REMS proposal.
3.

Patient Monitoring

The FDA can also require the ETASU of patient monitoring in the
next opioid REMS proposal,202 which includes techniques such as
drug testing and pill counting.203 Patient monitoring helps doctors
track whether patients are following their recommended treatment
course. However, if the FDA required doctors to conduct drug testing
or pill counts, it would overstep its authority by regulating the practice
of medicine.
On several occasions courts have considered whether the federal
government has the authority to regulate medical practice or whether
that is an area of law reserved for the states.204 Most recently, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue in Gonzales v. Oregon.205 In this
case, the Attorney General argued that the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA) gave him the authority to prohibit doctors from using con200

FDAAA § 355-1(f)(3)(C).
See, e.g., Transcript for FDA’s Media Briefing on the Safe Use of Opioids,
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See Andrea M. Trescot et al., Opioids in the Management of Chronic NonCancer Pain: An Update of American Society of the Interventional Pain Physicians’(ASIPP) Guidelines, 11 PAIN PHYSICIAN S5, S41 (2008).
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201

HEALTH MATRIX

306

[Vol. 22: 273]

trolled substances for physician-assisted suicide.206 The Supreme
Court explained that even though Congress has the authority to regulate medical practice in order to prevent doctors from promoting illicit
drug trafficking, Congress lacks the authority to regulate medical
practice generally.207 Furthermore, while Congress delegated some of
its authority to the Attorney General under the CSA, the Attorney
General’s authority was specifically limited to promulgating and enforcing rules that (1) relate to manufacturing, distributing, and dispensing controlled substances; and (2) are necessary to his functions
under the CSA’s subchapter “Control and Enforcement.”208 The Supreme Court rejected the argument that Congress granted the Attorney
General broad implied authority that would include regulation of physician-assisted suicide.209 The Supreme Court, instead, reasoned that
interpreting the Attorney General’s power more broadly to cover an
area of medical practice, such as physician-assisted suicide, would
“transform the carefully described limits on the Attorney General’s
authority over registration and scheduling into mere suggestions.”210
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Oregon was consistent with prior cases concerning the authority of federal regulatory
agencies and the practice of medicine. Two decades before Gonzales,
the Fifth Circuit considered the limits of the FDA’s authority in U.S.
v. Evers.211 A doctor, who was accused of violating the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, produced an FDA notice from the Federal
Register as evidence that the FDA should not be regulating his practice of medicine.212 In the FDA’s own words, “Congress did not intend the Food and Drug Administration to interfere with medical practice.”213 As a result, the Evers court declined to reconsider the district
court’s decision that the federal government was prohibited from interfering with a doctor’s prescription practices. The court explained
that medical practice is not an area generally regulated by the federal
government or one of its agencies.214
206
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If the FDA decides to require the patient monitoring ETASU as
part of an opioid REMS in the future, it should expect to face challenges from doctors and state medical boards on the theory that the
federal government is not authorized to regulate the practice of medicine. This potential challenge may explain why the FDAAA proposed
several ETASUs and made them optional strategies. It may also explain why the FDA did not include the patient monitoring ETASU in
the initial opioid REMS proposal. The FDA may believe that patient
monitoring is an indispensible component of opioid regulation, but it
should be careful not to overstep its authority and should leave enforcement of this ETASU to state medical boards instead.
4.

Drug Registries

The FDAAA also gives the FDA authority to include a drug registry in the next opioid REMS proposal.215 However, as discussed in
the previous section, the FDA likely lacks the authority to require
prescribers to record patient data in a drug registry. Therefore, the
success of this ETASU will depend on the voluntary participation of
pharmacists, doctors, and nurses.
If the FDA seriously considers incorporating a drug registry into
the next opioid REMS proposal, it should look to the states.216 Using
information gathered by the states would cut down on the cost of implementation and prevent duplication in data collection. The FDA
should also consider looking at registries used in other areas of medicine. Registries are frequently used in obstetrics to estimate the risks
of prenatal prescription drugs by recording data from pregnant mothers.217 Health care providers report data on birth defects and fetal
losses associated with prescription drugs to a registry using a toll-free
number.218 With any database, however, there are privacy concerns.
The more patient-identifying information a database contains, the
greater the privacy concerns. If the FDA considers moving forward
with its own drug registry, it should carefully weigh the benefit of a
national drug registry created by the FDA, against the costs, which
include the financial burden of developing and maintaining the registry, as well as the risks to patient privacy.
215
Registry refers to a database of information used to track trends the health
conditions of a particular population of patients. See FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 3551(f)(3)(F) (2011).
216
See supra Part III.A.4.
217
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RECOMMENDED STRATEGY FOR THE FDA AND STATE
MEDICAL BOARDS

Considering the lessons learned from the initial opioid REMS
proposal and the limitations of the FDAAA, the FDA should employ a
three-fold strategy going forward. It should involve (1) the FDA developing an opioid REMS proposal with a web-based training program funded by manufacturers, (2) the state legislatures enforcing
opioid training requirements and issuing opioid registration numbers
to doctors, and (3) the FDA collaborating with the states on data collection.
A.

Training Program

When the FDA drafts the next opioid REMS proposal, it should
require an opioid training program with content covering all types of
opioids, including immediate-release and extended-release opioids.219
The program should advise doctors on how to distinguish between
patients who are less likely to abuse opioids and those who are more
likely. Recognizing the latter category of patients requires the skills
to identify withdrawal symptoms and uncover a patient’s history of
substance abuse. In order to help improve drug abuse detection, the
program should include multimedia, such as videos and pictures, to
help illustrate drug abuse behaviors in patients of all age cohorts and
racial groups.
Doctors not only have to identify patients who are good candidates for opioids, they also have to write a prescription for an appropriate dose based on the patient’s age, weight, and health condition.
The training program should discuss the appropriate types of opioids
and corresponding doses for treating both chronic and acute pain patients.220 It would be helpful if the program presented a checklist of
considerations, which doctors could routinely review when making
decisions about opioid prescriptions.
The FDA should develop and maintain the training program or
hire a third party, such as a professional organization of pain physicians, to do so. Development and maintenance of the training program should be funded by manufacturers based on the market share
they hold in the opioid industry. The market share calculations should
be based on each pharmaceutical company’s gross earnings from
219
220
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opioids during the previous calendar year. Under this system, smaller
pharmaceutical companies introducing just one or two opioid products
into the market would not be burdened by a significant training program expense.
The FDA should ensure that there is one uniform training program for opioids rather than individual programs developed by each
manufacturer. If every manufacturer had to create a program, it
would be unnecessarily duplicative and would place a very heavy
financial burden on manufacturers. The burden would be especially
heavy if the training programs involved face-to-face instruction because the manufacturers would have to hire individuals each year to
teach the courses at various locations across the country. Furthermore, placing a heavy financial burden on manufacturers would likely
have the unintended consequence of discouraging some manufacturers
from seeking opioid drug approval. If fewer manufacturers entered
the market, pharmaceutical development would slow and patient access to safe pain relief would be hindered. Thus, the FDA, or a third
party hired by the FDA, should develop a web-based training program
because, among other reasons, it is a more cost-effective approach.
A web-based training program would be better than face-to-face
instruction for several reasons. First, a web-based program allows
doctors to take the course at a time and place of their choice.221 Doctors would not have to pay to travel to a training program or rearrange
their schedule in order to attend. Secondly, the information would be
easy to access from either a personal or public computer.222 A doctor
would register for a username and password, which they could use to
save their progress on the training program each time they logged out
of the website. Finally, a web-based training program would make it
easier for the FDA or a third party to update the training information
as new data becomes available.223
A web-based training program would have its limitations. Doctors who do not have a strong internet connection for viewing multimedia might have difficulty completing the course.224 Technical support would be required to resolve these types of problems. A webbased program would also require the doctors to take more personal
initiative to complete all of the lessons and read all of the material.225
In order to ensure that the doctors complete the program with a certain
221
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level of competence, the FDA should consider including a certification examination as the last step of the training program.
The certification examination should consist of fifty or so multiple-choice questions randomly generated from a database of several
hundred multiple-choice questions. The certification exam at the end
of the training program would not be as rigorous as the board certification requirement applied to doctors prescribing opioids to patients
for addiction treatment.226 Nonetheless, doctors might be tempted to
skip over material or have another individual take the certification
exam on their behalf. The FDA should require doctors to complete a
signature form, which states that they completed the exam without the
assistance of another person and that the exam reflects their level of
competency in the area of opioid prescribing. The doctors would then
send the signature form to the medical board in the state where they
practice medicine. The state medical boards should complete the remaining administrative steps for this recommended strategy.
B.

State-Enforced Training Requirement

The states should assume the responsibility of enforcing doctor
participation in the opioid training program. However, rather than
requiring all doctors to complete opioid training, the states should
only require doctors writing opioid prescriptions for pain to pass the
certification examination. While this policy would still require many
doctors to complete the training program, including surgeons, general
practitioners, and even dentists, it would allow doctors who do not
want to prescribe opioids to opt out of the training program and certification process.
If participating doctors finish the training and take the certification examination, they should complete the process by sending the
signature form to their state medical board. Staff at the medical board
should check the name of the doctor on the form with the examination
results on the training course website, confirming that the doctor
achieved a passing score. In addition, the staff should verify that the
signature on the opioid training form matches the documents signed
by the doctor when she applied for a medical license in the state. If
the doctor meets both requirements, the state medical board should
issue the doctor an opioid registration number. Thereafter, each time
the doctor writes an opioid prescription for pain, she must put her
opioid registration number on the prescription in order for it to be
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valid.227 Pharmacists will play an important role in enforcing this
process, since they will have to reject opioid prescriptions if doctors
fail to include their opioid registration number on the prescription
form. While the financial burden on state medical boards would be
minimal under this system, states could nonetheless impose a nominal
fee on doctors seeking an opioid registration number to offset the administrative costs associated with this process.
This recommended strategy requires the states to pass a new law
so that opioid prescriptions written for pain relief would be invalid
unless doctors include their opioid registration number on the prescription form. If states decline to implement this strategy, the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) should talk with state representatives and persuade them to pass laws that revise the prescription
requirements. Given that the FSMB represents seventy professional
medical organizations and 750,000 practicing physicians, it likely has
the resources and support to influence state action.228 While critics
may argue that one new federal law would be more efficient to pass
than fifty state laws, a federal law takes years to navigate the legislative process and requires the support of Congress, which has been
polarized on health care issues in recent years. Additionally, the state
governments are a better place to modify the laws of opioid prescribing than the federal government because enforcing participation in
opioid training programs through the states reduces the risk that the
FDA will overstep its authority by regulating the practice of medicine.229
C.

Data Sharing

The FDA should collaborate with states that use prescription drug
monitoring programs (PMPs). The FDA should request data from
these programs on a quarterly basis and assess whether drug abuse
and drug diversion problems decrease after the implementation of
opioid REMS. While the FDA has authority under the FDAAA to
establish new drug registries, resources may not be available for this
purpose. Additionally, creation of an FDA drug registry would duplicate preexisting databases at the state level. Therefore, the key focus
of FDA and state collaboration should be sharing data and tracking
227

This is a similar system used for regulating doctors who are administering
addiction treatments to patients using buprenorphine. The recommended strategy
proposes expanding this to prescriptions for all opioids. Cf. Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Servs. Admin., supra note 167.
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the impact of opioid REMS on prescription drug abuse, diversion, and
undertreatment.
There should not be any legal barriers to sharing data since most
state laws concerning PMPs allow regulatory agencies, such as the
FDA, to access their data.230 Although, as the states share data with
more individuals or organizations, there is an increased risk that confidential information about a patient’s health condition will fall into
the wrong hands. The states should consider removing from the data
any primary identifying information, such as patients’ names or social
security numbers, before transferring the data to the FDA. Removing
this information would not decrease the value of the data, since the
FDA is primarily focused on the prevalence and trends of opioid prescribing at the population level, rather than the patient level. Additionally, the states might consider using computer software to encrypt
the data before passing it to the FDA for analysis, but the details of
this would require further investigation and development.
D.

Other Recommendations

Although the recommendation for a three-fold approach would
likely improve opioid prescribing habits, there are several issues, such
as public education campaigns and drug collection programs, which
are not mentioned in the strategy above. Their omission from the
strategy does not mean that they are any less important. Rather, they
are strategies that should be considered by other regulatory agencies
and the FDA at some point in the future. The FDA and state medical
boards should use the recommended strategy as a short-term plan and
reserve the other suggestions for long-term goals. In fact, some of the
short-term plans may help achieve the long-term goals because improving doctor competency today will lead to safer opioid pain relief
in the future. Over the years, information about health risks associated with opioids will trickle down from health care providers to the
general public, even without formal interventions.
CONCLUSION
A common misconception is that people who abuse and misuse
drugs do so intentionally. Over the past decade, testimonies by patients like Betty Tully have shed light on the truth. 231 Many patients
seeking pain relief receive not only a prescription for opioids, but a
230
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devastating addiction through no fault of their own. As opioid use
becomes more prevalent, the magnitude of risk for abuse, diversion,
and undertreatment will continue to increase. The FDA and state
medical boards should take advantage of the present opportunities to
improve prescriber competence and work towards making opioids a
safer option for pain relief.
In 2007, Congress passed the FDAAA and significantly transformed the FDA’s authority to regulate drug manufacturers. Through
a three-tiered system of regulation called REMS, the FDA gained the
authority to regulate drugs after the approval process by requiring
manufacturers to engage in risk-mitigating activities such as distributing medication guides and communication plans to doctors prescribing their drugs. Since the advisory committees rejected the FDA’s
initial opioid REMS proposal for being too weak, the FDA should
strengthen the training requirements for doctors prescribing opioids to
patients for chronic and acute pain relief. However, the FDA cannot
single-handedly enforce stronger regulatory requirements against doctors. State medical boards should become more involved in opioid
regulation by requiring doctors to successfully complete an opioid
training program and certification examination before allowing doctors to write opioid prescriptions. With the help of state medical
boards, the FDA can achieve a proper balance between opioid regulation and medically necessary opioid use.

